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Introduction 
How does perception tell us about the world around us? Do our perceptual 
experiences represent the world to us? If so, how are they representational? 
Moreover, how do our perceptual experiences provide the basis for our empirical 
beliefs?1 These questions are among those that are central to the philosophy of 
perception. Let us look at the first one: How does perception tell us about our 
environment? Many philosophers agree that perception tells us about the way the 
world is by being representational of the world. This theory of perception is one of 
many amongst the philosophy of mind that fa ll under the umbrella of 
lntentionalism, or representationalism. 
Intentionalism 
! 
lntentionalist 
Theories of perception 
However, intentionalist theories of perception differ from each other in certain ways. 
One prominent point of disagreement is over how the content of perception is 
representational. Some writers claim that perception, li ke other mental states such as 
beliefs and desires have conceptual contents. That is, their contents are like the 
contents of thoughts: conceptually structured and dependent upon possession of a 
conceptual capacity. This is 'conceptualism' and these theorists wi ll be called 
' conceptuali sts.' There are other writers, however, who deny this claim and argue that 
the content of perception is non-conceptual. These are the ' non-conceptualists' and 
they advocate 'non-conceptual ism'. Let us first turn to a brief introduction into non-
conceptual ism. 
1 The way in which one characterises perceptual experience shapes one's subsequent account of how 
perceptual experiences cause empirical beliefs. Therefore the answer to the question 'what is a 
perceptual experience?' will largely affect the response to ' how can perceptual experiences cause 
beliefs?' (Why this is the case will be shown in the following discussion.) 
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Non-Conceptual ism 
Non -Conceptual ism 
Intentionalism 
L 
Intentionalist 
Theories of perception 
Conceptual ism 
In a nutshell , the non-conceptualist thesis is that there are intentional , 
representational contents of mental states that do not require their bearer to possess 
concepts in order for them to be present. These mental states are states with non-
conceptual content. A widely discussed mental state that has, on this view, non-
conceptual content is perceptual experience. Non-conceptual perceptual experience 
represents the world as being a certain way and yet does not require the perceiver to 
possess concepts that characterise the content of her experience. 
There are two prominent arguments given in favour of the non-conceptualist 's 
theory of perceptual experience: 
I) The "Richness Argument" (Heck, 2000). Writers have argued that we can 
have perceptual experiences that represent worldly things for which we do 
not possess concepts. Look at all the different shades of colour we can 
perceive, they proclaim. Clearly, we can perceive many shades that we do 
not possess concepts for. Christopher Peacocke writes: 
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There are many dimensions - hue, shape size, direction - such that any value on 
that dimension may enter the fine-grained content of an experience. In 
particular, experience is not restricted in its range of possible contents to those 
points or ranges picked out by concepts - red, square, straight ahead -
possessed by the perceiver ( 1992:68). 
2) The Argument from Evolution. This argument claims that it is likely that 
perception is primitive and we had the ability to perceive the world around 
us long before our conceptual linguistic capacities evolved. For this reason, 
we probably share the non-conceptual operations of our perceptual systems 
with some animals. Peacocke offers a complex account of the nature of 
perceptual content. He holds that perception has non-conceptual content 
mainly because we must be able to 
Describe cotTectly the overlap between human perception and that of 
some of the non-linguistic animals. While being reluctant to attribute 
concepts to the lower animals, many of' us would also want to insist that 
the property of (say) representing a flat brown surface as being at a 
certain distance from one can be common to the perceptions of humans 
and of lower animals .. . it is literally the same representational property 
that the two experiences possess, even if the human experience also has 
richer representational contents in addition (200 I a: 613-614 ). 
In summary, these arguments claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-
conceptual and it is not necessary that a perceiver possess the concepts that 
characterise this content in order for the state to have this type of content. That is, 
the content of perceptual experience cannot be identified with the content of 
propositional attitudes. It is non-conceptual. Tim Crane succinctly sums up the non-
conceptualist theory of perception: 'for something, X, to believe that a is F, X must 
possess the concepts a and F. But for X to merely represent that a is F, X does not 
have to possess these concepts. It is in the latter case that X is in a state with non-
conceptual content' ( 1992: 141 ). 
As a final note, there are two general approaches to the definition of non-conceptual 
content. Crane, as shown in the quote above, defines a non-conceptual state in terms 
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of whether or not concepts need to be possessed in order for it to be entertained. 
This is also the approach I have taken in this brief section on non-conceptual 
content. Christopher Peacocke, however, defines non-conceptual content more 
directly as content with certain types o f non-conceptual constituents. This leads him 
to a more detailed formulation of a theory of non-conceptual content as he attempts 
to precisely characterise this type of content. Peacocke ' s theory of non-conceptual 
content is one of the fundamental positions in this literature and so it is to 
Peacocke's theory that we will turn below. 
Conceptualists such as Bill Brewer and John McDowell have put forward a 
succession of arguments against the non-conceptualist position; focussing on the 
notion that the content o f perception is non-conceptual. Let us look at 
conceptual ism and briefly examine some of the objections they raise against non-
conceptualism. 
Concep tual ism 
The general conceptualist position is that the content of perceptual experience is 
conceptual: it is composed of concepts and requires the bearer to possess the 
concepts that characterise them. This conceptual content is a proposition, or 
thought. Conceptual contents, or propositions, then, are stmctured by concepts and 
are representational in virtue o f these concepts. Consider this example. The cat 
hopes the bird is tasty. The content ' the bird is tasty' is composed of the concept 
'bird ' which, when combined with the predicate ' is tasty' , fonns a proposition that 
represents a state of affairs: ' the bird is tasty'. And, to reiterate, possession of the 
concepts that comprise the content of perceptual experience is required in order to 
entertain that particular perceptual experience. There are several motivations behind 
this theory: 
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l) This is a response to the richness argument mentioned above.2 The 
conceptualists hold that an entirely conceptual perceptual experience can in 
fact accommodate all the detail of a scene. McDowell is the strongest 
proponent of this argument. In his Mind and World, McDowell argues: 
In the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively transcends one's 
conceptual powers - an experience that ex h_vpothesi affords a suitable sample -
one can give linguistic express ion to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as 
the experience, by uttering a phrase like " that shade", in which the 
demonstrative exploits the presence of a sample ( 1994:57).3 
2) But the most fundamental argument behind the conceptualist thesis is based 
on the premise that we must be able to justify our empirical beliefs. That is, 
we must be able to give reasons for our beliefs about the world. These 
reasons must necessarily be conceptual. McDowell puts several arguments 
for why reasons require conceptual contents. Here are two of the main ones: 
I - In order for experience to justify belief, a logical , 
inferential relation must relate experience and belief. 
Only conceptual contents can stand in this logical 
relation to beliefs . Experiences do justify beliefs, 
Therefore the content of perception is conceptual. 
2 This argument is that we should hold that perception has a non-conceptual content because we can 
have perceptual experiences of greater detail than we have concepts to conceptualise and express 
that detail with. By detail , I mean there may be more spatial features , colour shades or frequencies of 
sound, for example, in an environment than the perceiver can accommodate using the concepts 
within her grasp. 
3 Demonstrative concepts are concepts such as ' that shade' or ' that spatial feature', or ' that sound'. 
There are several defining cond itions of a demonstrative concept. A person can be said to possess a 
demonstrative concept only if she can, at least for a short time after, correct ly apply the concept in 
the absence of the sample. For example, she might see a colour chart and pick out the colour she 
likes for a wall and then for a few moments afterwards be able to use that concept correctly in 
thought and speech. This is what McDowell terms a ' recognitional capacity, possibly quite short 
lived, that sets in with the experience ' (1994:57). 
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2 - Reasons must be articulable. Only that which is 
conceptual is articulable. Therefore, in order for 
perceptual experience to j ustify, or provide reasons for, 
our beliefs perceptual experience must be conceptual. 
To sum up, on one hand we have non-conceptualists, such as Peacocke and Crane, 
who hold that the content of experience is non-conceptual. On the other, we have 
the conceptualists, such as Mc Dowell and Brewer who maintain that the content of 
perceptual experience is conceptua l. 
l 
Non-Conceptual ism 
Motivations: 
Intentionalisrn 
l 
Intentional ist 
Theories of perception 
l 
Conceptual ism 
Motivations: 
- Response to the richness argument The Richness Argument 
The Evolution Argument - Reasons require conceptual contents 
The arguments in favour of and against conceptual ism and non-conceptual ism have 
been the subj ects of much debate. Conceptualists have responded to both of the 
motivations for non-conceptual ism, but the non-conceptualists find these responses 
implausible. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look beyond the dilemma that 
arises from the argument that reasons require conceptual contents. The dilemma is 
this : if reasons do require conceptual contents, then we find ourselves in one of 
three unattractive positions: ( I) we' ll be forced to accept the implausibilities that 
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non-conceptualists claim inherently exist in the idea that conceptual contents alone 
justify beliefs, (2) we'll be forced to accept the implausibilites that conceptualists 
claim are present if we hold that non-conceptual experiences justify our beliefs, or 
(3) we must deny that experiences provide reasons for our beliefs at all. Therefore, 
in order to shed some light on why this dilemma arises and how we can go some 
way to resolving it, I will now focus on the debate that has arisen around 
McDowell's claim that reasons require conceptual contents. Recall that there were 
two main claims that McDowell makes for why reasons require conceptual 
contents: 
I - Only conceptual contents can stand in the necessary logical inferential 
relation to beliefs. 
2- Reasons must be articulable. Conceptual contents alone are articulable; 
therefore if experiences are to provide reasons, they must be conceptual. 
Christopher Peacocke, our main non-conceptualist, claims that reasons do not, in 
fact, require conceptual contents.4 He provides arguments for why we should not 
accept either of McDowell's claims above. In short, Peacocke tack les McDowell's 
arguments like this: 
I- In order for experience to justify belief, experience and belief ought to be 
rationally related. But this relation does not have to be the logical, 
inferential kind that McDowell maintains it is. 
2- In response to what he calls McDowell 's ' Argument from Articulability', 
Peacocke argues that reasons do not have to be conceptual in order for them 
to be articulable. 
4 Contrary to how it may appear here, Peacocke originally grounded reasons in non-conceptual 
content ( 1992: 80). McDowell 's later refutation o f his argument is a response to this. Peacocke was 
not, initially, responding to McDowell. 
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Let us now inspect these two pairs of opposing claims that McDowell and Peacocke 
have put forward. I will address the first pair of opposing claims - around the 
relation between experience and belief - because it demonstrates exactly how 
experience provides reasons for beliefs for each author. 
I will then examine the second pair of opposing claims - around whether or not 
reasons have to be conceptual in order for them to be articulated - for quite a 
different reason. There is, I think, an interesting point to be made about Peacocke 
and McDowell's disagreement over this issue. I will show that this particular 
disagreement rests on an equivocation. 
The equivocation stems from the fact that two different theories of concepts are 
used in the arguments for the opposing positions. I will demonstrate that there is a 
radical difference between the theories of concepts on either side of this debate . 
And according to McDowell's theory of concepts we can but conclude that 
conceptual contents alone are articulable, and by Peacocke 's theory of concepts, 
exactly the opposite must follow. 
This debate takes place in some very difficult literature. Therefore, before an 
inspection of the two sets of opposing claims can begin, the positions of Peacocke 
and McDowell must be expounded. For clari ty 's sake, the exegesis that follows of 
McDowell and Peacocke's theories is in the fonn of a textual analysis. It is hoped 
that this textual analysis will provide some clarification of these two major theories 
and work towards a demonstration of the presence of an equivocation in the 
'Argument from Articulability' debate. In summary, the aims of this paper are: 
• To provide a clear exposition of Peacocke and McDowell's theories of 
perceptual content and concepts. 
• To point out that their theories of concepts are radically different. 
• To shed some light on why they both adopt a different stance with regard to 
the argument from articulability by arguing that their different positions are 
in part motivated by different theories of concepts. 
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Chapter one of this essay examines Peacocke 's non-conceptual ism. The second 
chapter attempts an explanation of McDowell's conceptual ism and theory of 
concepts. Chapter three enters into a discussion of the first pair of opposing claims 
around the relation between experience and belief. The fourth chapter looks at the 
second pair of opposing claims around the argument from articulability. This essay 
concludes with the proposal that the argument from articulability rests on an 
equivocation. 
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